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            Abstract 
John McDowell and Richard Rorty draw on Kant’s influential 
account of experience. For Rorty, Kant is the antagonist who 
succumbs to foundationalism or what Sellars calls the Myth of 
the Given and Wittgenstein is the hero who helps in 
overcoming the siren call of the Myth. McDowell, however, is 
ambivalent toward Kant. With Sellars, he applauds Kant as the 
hero who helped us vanquish the Myth of the Given. But he 
argues that Kant failed to recognize the full strength of his 
account of experience and capitulated to a subjective idealism. 
Wittgenstein, for McDowell, is the hero who helps us achieve 
an account of experience that gets to the things themselves. I 
adjudicate the philosophical and the exegetical tensions 
between Rorty and McDowell and support the latter’s 
approach to experience and to the reading of Kant and 
Wittgenstein.  
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The aim of this essay is to explore Richard Rorty and John McDowell’s 
respective discussions of the relation between Kant and Wittgenstein. I take 
Rorty’s readings of both Kant and Wittgenstein to be helpfully illustrative of 
ways in which each of these philosophers have come to be read within 
contemporary analytic philosophy. I will oppose Rorty’s readings of them 
(as well as the manner in which he seeks to align them) with the readings 
(and the resulting alignment) of Kant and Wittgenstein proposed by 
McDowell. It is the hope of this essay that the tension in Rorty and 
McDowell’s readings of these two seminal figures will enable us to see in a 
new light a central problem they sought to unravel: the place of experience 
in relation to the conceptual space (i.e., the logical space of reasons). 
1. It has been said that post-Kantian philosophers face two alternatives: they 
can either philosophize with Kant or against Kant. This proclamation 
suggests two different approaches to the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, and, 
indeed, some commentators have wished to see Wittgenstein as following in 
Kant’s footsteps,1  while others have read him as an anti-Kantian.2   This 
paper shares the conviction that it is profitable to understand 
Wittgenstein’s aims in philosophy against the background of Kant’s thought. 
On the part of many commentators, however, the presumption behind such 
an approach to Wittgenstein seems to be that it is clear what philosophizing 
with or against Kant means, the only remaining question being which side 
of this clearly defined divide Wittgenstein is on.3 
Richard Rorty takes Wittgenstein as an opponent of Kant’s philosophy, while 
John McDowell sees him as a champion of the critical enterprise inaugurated 
by Kant. Their mutual interest in proposing an alignment of Wittgenstein 
and Kant can invite the impression that McDowell takes Wittgenstein to 
straightforwardly champion that which Rorty takes him to oppose. But 
closer examination of their respective readings of Wittgenstein (and of their 
respective discussions of Wittgenstein’s relation to Kant) reveals that their 
divergences turn, in part, on very different Kantian account of experience 
as involving the faculties of sensibility and understanding.  
Rorty fastens on to the Kantian distinction between phenomenon and 
noumenon and interprets the Kantian manifold of intuition as the outcome 
of the impingement of noumenal reality on sensibility. The manifold of 
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intuition is construed, by Rorty, as contributing immediately given bits of 
knowledge which provide the content of phenomenal experience. Rorty 
applies Wilfrid Sellars’s critique of modern empiricism to Kant’s account of 
the relation of sensibility to understanding, claiming that it involves an 
illicit transition between (what Sellars calls) “the space of reasons” and “the 
space of causes.” This opens Kant to the charge that his conception of 
experience (in its appeal to a purely passive faculty of sensibility) relies upon 
a version of (what Sellars dubbed) the Myth of the Given. Rorty takes the 
moral of the bankruptcy of any such account of experience – any account 
which relies upon an appeal to the Given – to be that the only metaphysically 
innocent relation between world and mind is causal. Rorty reads 
Wittgenstein as also drawing such a moral, and thus insisting upon a sharp 
separation between “the space of reasons” and “the space of causes.”4 
McDowell’s relation to Rorty is complex. He shares Rorty’s admiration for 
Sellars’s critique of empiricism. McDowell’s reading of Wittgenstein (as a 
critic of such accounts) thus shares much common ground with Rorty’s. He 
differs with Rorty, however, in two critical respects: 1) on McDowell’s 
reading of Kant, Sellars’s attack on the Given can be seen as a reformulation 
of a Kantian point, and 2) McDowell reads both Kant and Wittgenstein as 
criticizing the moral Rorty draws from Sellars’s work. In particular, 
McDowell criticizes Rorty for not allowing an external rational constraint 
on the mind. For McDowell, Kant’s philosophy contains the resources for 
bridging the Rortian divide between causes and reasons. McDowell, 
therefore, takes a proper understanding of Kant’s point – that experience is 
the product of the joint action of the faculties of sensibility and 
understanding5 – to allow for a way of overcoming Rorty’s dualism. On this 
view, intuitions are rescued from the status of mere Givens in that the 
faculty of sensibility is receptive (not to the causal impact of the noumenal 
world but) to the rational bearing of the empirical world. The 
conceptualizations of the faculty of understanding, on the other hand, 
figure in an account of how the world can be so.6 
For McDowell, Wittgenstein follows in Kant’s footsteps in that he also rejects 
the Given without succumbing to Rorty’s dualism. Wittgenstein’s Private 
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Language Argument, according to McDowell, is an application of a general 
strategy for rejecting the Given. The sort of private ostensive definition 
presupposed by the possibility of a private language involves an implicit 
endorsement of the Given: such private acts of ostension are, in effect, 
abstractions from a bare presence delivered by the private linguist’s 
receptivity to his own inner life. McDowell reads Wittgenstein as a Kantian 
insofar as he takes Wittgenstein’s rejection of the possibility of such acts of 
ostension to allow for the deliverances of sensibility to come as already 
conceptually structured. He, thus, takes Wittgenstein (pace Rorty) to be 
making a version of a Kantian point (concerning how sensibility and 
understanding are fused) – one which will look hopelessly metaphysical to 
Rorty – in his remark in Philosophical Investigations that thought does not 
“stop anywhere short of the fact” (1958, §95). 
His admiration for Kant notwithstanding, McDowell suggests that Kant 
(despite the merits of his account of experience) recedes into a subjective 
idealism via his appeal to the supersensible affection of sensibility. For 
McDowell, Kant succumbs to a need to divorce the world of human 
experience from the world-in-itself. Wittgenstein, however, is concerned to 
elucidate the dependence of our concepts on our practical engagement with 
the world and thereby to exorcise the impulse to something like a Kantian 
invocation of the supersensible beyond our various applications of concepts. 
  
2. Richard Rorty finds a philosophical account which relies on the Given 
problematic and much of his own work centers around a criticism of such 
an account. In Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Rorty specifies the notion 
of the Given7 (which he opposes) as “the notion that a quasi-mechanical 
account of the way in which our immaterial tablets are dented by the 
material world will help us know what we are entitled to believe” (1979, 143).  
In “The World Well Lost,” Rorty identifies Kant as a proponent of this view 
of the Given. Kant wishes to “split the organism up into a receptive wax 
tablet on the one hand and an ‘active’ interpreter of what nature has there 
imprinted on the other” (1982a, 4). Rorty’s point is that it is philosophically 
suspect to endorse such a division of labor in the construction of experience 
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– one according to which there is a passive sensory intake of content, on the 
one hand, and the understanding’s active organization of that content, on 
the other. Much of the negative thrust of Rorty’s philosophical work has to 
do with a rejection of this philosophically suspect position (often in the 
guise of an attack on Kant’s account of experience). The positive account of 
experience presupposed by Rorty’s philosophy – one which is designed, 
above all, to save us from falling back into an illicit appeal to the Given – 
requires that a wedge be driven between the “space of reasons” and the 
“space of causes,” allowing only a causal link between them. 
Rorty’s polemic against Kant, in “The World Well Lost” and elsewhere, plays 
a central role in his critique of the traditional philosophical conception of 
“the world.” Rorty seeks to do away, once and for all, with the notion of a 
world to which experience is related only passively. The world which is well 
lost, according to Rorty, is one which leaves its imprint on the mind’s passive 
faculty, which then in turn, in cooperation with an active faculty, produces 
“experience.” Rorty ascribes this conception of “the world” to Kant and 
proposes to undermine it by presenting a dilemma8 whose conclusion “casts 
doubt on the notion of a faculty of receptivity” (4). Rorty argues that 
1) If a Kantian intuition is effable, it is a perceptual judgment 
and not an intuition as such. However, a perceptual judgment 
is incapable of having an explanatory function (explaining how 
it is that experience is in touch with reality) since it 
is already transformed by the active faculty.9 
2) If a Kantian intuition is ineffable, it is incapable of having an 
explanatory function. 
3) Either the Kantian intuition is effable, or it is ineffable. 
4) Therefore, the Kantian intuition is incapable of having an 
explanatory function. 
The conclusion of this dilemma undermines (what Rorty takes to be) the 
contribution of the Kantian faculty of receptivity. If the contribution of the 
passive faculty cannot ever be specified, then any appeal to the impression 
of reality in the construction of “experience” is vacuous. Since “the world” 
plays no role in the construction of experience, Rorty concludes that this 
purportedly Kantian notion of the world “can no longer be given a sense” 
(4). It is a world well lost.  
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For Rorty, Kant’s philosophy rests upon a problematic commitment – one 
which, he thinks, recurs throughout the philosophical tradition – a 
commitment to a particular conception of experience (as comprised of given 
bits of knowledge obtained by the world’s impingement on a purely sensory 
faculty). Rorty has maintained some version of this reading of Kant 
throughout his career. In “Dewey’s Metaphysics,” for instance, Rorty 
criticizes Dewey for following in the misleading footsteps of Kant. 10  In 
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Rorty supplies a brief intellectual history 
of post-Kantian philosophy based on his account of what is problematic in 
the position espoused by Kant. According to Rorty, the Kantian heritage 
splits into two schools, as it were. The first is “German idealism” culminating 
in the philosophy of Hegel. The second is “the ‘back to Kant’ movement of 
the 1860’s in Germany” (1979, 134). Although “German idealism” made some 
progress in overcoming the initial limitations imposed by its Kantian 
commitments, the “back to Kant” movement sacrificed what progress had 
been made and propagated the Kantian infection even further. What Rorty 
takes exception to in the philosophy of the “back to Kant” movement is their 
preoccupation with (what they called) Erkenntnistheorie, relying on the 
distinction introduced by Kant between knowledge (Erkenntnis) and science 
(Wissenschaft) (1929, A832=B860). Philosophy as Erkenntnistheorie, according 
to Rorty, aims to chart the mental and noumenal influences on the region of 
appearance in order to endow the claims to phenomenal knowledge with 
the certainty worthy of a science.11 Due to the catastrophically far-reaching 
influence of Kant’s conception of experience, one of the most important 
tasks of twentieth-century philosophy, according to Rorty, has been the 
overcoming of Kant’s legacy. On Rorty’s telling of the story, as we shall see 
in a moment, Wittgenstein is one of the heroes who taught us how to live 
without Kantianism. Before we turn to Rorty’s portrait of the hero, however, 
we need to take a closer look at the work of a figure who (Rorty thinks) 
helped us to properly identify the villain. 
3. Rorty’s main source for the attack on Kant’s commitment to the Given is 
Wilfrid Sellars’s seminal work, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. In this 
philosophically ground-breaking work, Sellars identifies “the point of the 
epistemological category of the given” to be the explication of “the idea that 
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empirical knowledge rests on a ‘foundation’ of non-inferential knowledge of 
matter of fact” (1997, 15). Sellars’s focus, in this article, is a specific version 
of the Given, embraced by modern forms of empiricism, according to which 
entitlement to a claim is supplied by a description of a causal process 
(involving the impact of external objects on the claimant’s sensory 
surfaces).12  For Sellars, the causal impingement of real things on the mind’s 
sensibility cannot license an entitlement to a claim. Sellars points out that 
“in characterizing an episode or state as that of knowing, we are not giving 
an empirical description of that episode or state; we are placing it in the 
logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says” 
(16). Entitlement cannot come from outside of the “logical space of reasons,” 
via the causal impingement of an external reality on the senses, but must be 
supplied from within the space of reasons. In other words, the claimant is 
entitled to a claim only when she can justify the claim rationally (rather than 
by appeal to an external and merely causal determination). 
Rorty argues that Kant falls prey to Sellars’s criticism of the Myth of the 
Given in that he (Kant) seeks to ground the claims to knowledge by giving 
an account of the production of empirical (knowable) objects. In Rorty’s 
reading of Kant, intuitions provide the justification of knowledge claims by 
issuing from sensibility’s trafficking with the real (noumenal) world. 
However, if intuitions are somehow prior to any experience (outside the 
space of reasons) then they are not knowledge and cannot ground claims to 
knowledge. Intuitions cannot occupy a place within the space of reasons 
either, for then they would be perceptual judgments and would lose their 
privileged status of communicating the real. Hence one cannot employ them 
in justifying what one says. But if one cannot so employ them, then (Rorty 
concludes) the whole account of intuitions and organizing conceptual 
schemata must go by the board.  
It is important to recognize that Rorty’s move – although prompted by 
Sellars’s attack on the Given – is not a mere extension of Sellars’s thought. 
For Sellars, in contrast to Rorty, there is an intimate relation between causes 
and reasons. Hence, the moral which Rorty draws from Sellars’s attack on 
the Given (and attributes to Wittgenstein) can be set out more clearly by 
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developing Sellars’s conclusions and contrasting them with Rorty’s. 
4. Sellars’s rejection of the sensory Given involves, as we have seen, the 
repudiation of “the idea that empirical knowledge rests on a ‘foundation’ of 
noninferential knowledge of matter of fact” (15). Later, when developing a 
particular form of the Myth of the Given, Sellars clarifies what he means by 
“foundation”. He refers to 
a structure of particular matter of fact such that (a) each fact 
can not only be noninferentially known to be the case, but 
presupposes no other knowledge either of particular matter of 
fact, or of general truths; and (b) such that the noninferential 
knowledge of facts belonging to this structure constitutes the 
ultimate court of appeals for all factual claims – particular and 
general – about the world (68-9). 
From this passage we can see that for Sellars, a non-inferential knowledge 
of matter of fact is a foundation if and only if (1) it is not justified by any 
other factual knowledge; and (2) it justifies all other factual knowledge about 
the world. To put it more precisely, the epistemological Given is the thesis 
that empirical knowledge is justified by non-inferential knowledge of 
matter of fact, which is not itself justified by other knowledge. As I show 
below, Sellars does not mean to deny that there is non-inferential 
knowledge of matter of fact, and that this knowledge justifies all other 
claims to factual knowledge. He accommodates these grounding features of 
the Given in his own position. He only denies (1), that is, the thesis that the 
non-inferential knowledge of matter of fact is itself unjustified by other 
knowledge [i.e., it is “self-authenticating” (73 & 77)]. He rejects this thesis 
because its endorsement would ground knowledge on something that has 
no rational credentials and enters our reasoning from the outside. Sellars, 
then, does not appeal to the affection of sensibility by an unknowable reality 
in order to ground our knowledge. Instead, he derives the rational authority 
of non-inferential factual knowledge from the application of concepts in 
sensory experience. These concepts are, in turn, available through our 
initiation into the public and linguistic space of reasons, enabling us to apply 
relevant concepts appropriately. For instance, Sellars holds that for 
endorsing the proposition “x, over there, is green” 
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[n]ot only must the conditions be of a sort that is appropriate 
for determining the color of an object by looking, the subject 
must know that the conditions of this sort are appropriate. And 
while this does not imply that one must have concepts before 
one has them, it does imply that one can have the concept green 
only by having a whole battery of concepts of which it is only 
one element (44). 
To put it more generally, for Sellars, the proper application of a concept in 
a non-inferential claim to perceptual knowledge presupposes the ability to 
apply a whole battery of other concepts – including the ones pertaining to 
other perceptible characteristics, more general (inclusive) concepts, and 
incompatible concepts. In other words, the truth of an observation report 
requires the claimant to be in the space of reasons. This requirement enables 
the sensory operation of concepts to which observation reports are 
accountable.13  As a result, the claim that ‘this is green’ is “evoked or wrung 
from the perceiver by the object perceived” (40). Sellars writes, 
[t]hus, when I say “X looks green to me now” I am reporting the 
fact that my experience is, so to speak, intrinsically, as an 
experience, indistinguishable from a veridical one of seeing that 
x is green. Included in the report is the ascription to my 
experience of the claim 'x is green'; and the fact that I make this 
report rather than the simple report “X is green” indicates that 
certain considerations have operated to raise, so to speak in a 
higher court, the question 'to endorse or not to endorse’ (41). 
In other words, I see that X is green and when I have doubts (e.g., X is too far 
or a source of sensory illusion is present), I can adjust by saying “X looks 
green to me” or “it looks as though there is a green X over there.” This allows 
Sellars to ground perceptual judgments in the sensing of sense contents 
without invoking the inferentialist denial of concepts to the sensings. 14 
Rorty, however, supports such a denial. 
5. Rorty finds that Sellars, despite his spirited attack on the Given, remains 
committed to a form of representationalism according to which not singular 
sentences (observation reports) but entire conceptual schemes must 
correspond (refer) to reality. Hence, Rorty divides representationalism into 
two categories. The first is the view that singular sentences represent reality. 
Rorty and Sellars, both, attack this view as a form of the Myth of the Given. 
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The second is Sellars’s own view according to which conceptual schemes, 
not the content determined by these concepts, represent reality, and 
scientific investigations can reveal the causal mechanisms underpinning the 
representation of reality by conceptual schemes. Rorty reacts to Sellars’s 
move by positing an impassable gulf between the space of reasons (i.e., the 
normative space of giving and asking for reasons) and the space of causal 
relations, in which sensory experience is included. He encourages non-
normative investigations of reference (word-world relations) and sensory 
experience, while emphasizing the irrelevance of these investigations to the 
tasks of epistemology and the space of reasons. Therefore, Rorty struggles 
to dismiss both forms of representationalism, emphasizing that the divide 
between the space of reasons and the space of causes must remain.15 
For Rorty, Wittgenstein is the hero who triumphs over the tradition 
(including Sellars) by positing the radical divide between the space of 
reasons and the space of causes. In “Wittgensteinian Philosophy and 
Empirical Psychology,” Rorty applauds Wittgenstein’s revolt against 
traditional philosophical notions and interprets this revolt as driving a deep 
wedge between empirical psychology as an investigation into the causal 
connection between the world and the mind, and philosophy as concerned 
with charting the space of reasons. Rorty concludes:  
the notions of “philosophical problems raised by psychological 
discoveries” and of “philosophical criticism of psychologists’ 
methods and doctrines” must stand or fall together. It would be 
well if they both fell (1977, 169).  
Rorty rejects each of these notions – “philosophical problems raised by 
psychological discoveries” and “philosophical criticism of psychologists’ 
methods and doctrines” – on the ground that each involves infringements 
on the divide between causes and reasons. In a later work, “Is Natural 
Science a Natural Kind?” Rorty reaffirms his commitment to the 
aforementioned reading of Wittgenstein, emphasizing that a causal account 
of the relation between the mind and the causal world is possible: 
“Wittgenstein’s picture of the relation of language to the world is much the 
same as Davidson’s. They both want us to see the relation as merely causal, 
rather than also as representational” (1991b, 60).16 Sellars’s exclusion from 
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the list is due to the fact that he – unlike Wittgenstein and Davidson – is 
committed to a form of representationalism. Wittgenstein and Davidson 
allow for a scientific (causal) account of how the mind relates to the world, 
but such an account has (pace Sellars) no representational role whatsoever. 
Thus, Wittgenstein and Davidson are the twin prophets of the dualism 
(between reasons and causes) which Rorty passionately endorses and which 
marks, in Rorty’s view, the decisive break with the Kantian legacy. 
6. McDowell is in agreement with Rorty’s contention that the Given must be 
discarded. However, McDowell does not agree with Rorty’s reading of Kant 
nor with the moral Rorty draws from the demise of the Given. For McDowell, 
Kant is not properly charged with a commitment to the Given, and, 
moreover, Kant’s philosophy itself contains the resources for overcoming 
the divide between the space of reasons and the space of causes. McDowell 
supports his reading of Kant by drawing on a passage in the “Transcendental 
Doctrine of Elements” of the Critique of Pure Reason where Kant states that 
“thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind” 
(1929, A51=B75). This passage, according to McDowell, supports the claim 
that the faculty of sensibility, supplying the manifold of intuition, and the 
faculty of understanding, supplying the concepts, do not operate 
independently of each other. Experience arise as the indissoluble product of 
the joint operation of the two faculties. Hence, McDowell concludes that the 
Kantian distinction between concepts and intuitions is properly understood 
as an abstraction from what, taken in itself, is a unitary process (1994, 9). 
Kant should not be read as advocating an analysis of knowledge as a two-
stage, portmanteau, affair: sensibility does not produce the manifold of 
intuition in order for understanding to then come along and endow it with 
significance. This conclusion undermines Rorty’s claim that Kant is 
committed to a version of the Myth of the Given. Such a claim would require 
Kant’s commitment to a fundamental separation between concepts and 
intuitions. McDowell argues that this is a misunderstanding of Kant. 
By emphasizing Kant’s insistence on the equiprimordiality of intuitions and 
concepts, McDowell may appear to be suggesting that Kant is not Rorty’s 
target but his ally. This is only partially true. McDowell would consider Kant 
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as Rorty’s ally only in the latter’s attack on the Given. However, McDowell is 
careful to point out that, in rejecting the Given, Kant’s view does not 
“threaten to disconnect thought from reality” (24). In other words, Kant 
does not recoil from the Given into a sort of Rortian coherentism which 
denies any external rational constraint bearing on thought and judgment. 
Such coherentism, according to McDowell, abuses the good Kantian move 
that thoughts without intuitions are empty by crediting intuitions with only 
a causal bearing on thoughts. In other words, coherentism denounces the 
problematic representational effect of the Given on thoughts and replaces it 
with a causal bearing, which is considered to be an adequate constraint on 
thought and judgment. The question that plagues coherentism concerns the 
precise nature of this causal bearing on knowledge. The question is critical 
in that the causal bearing must abstain from assuming a representational 
role as in the Myth of the Given or in Sellars’s scientism. However, if the 
commitment to the Given and scientism are resisted, it seems that the only 
alternative that remains is Rorty’s chasm between causes and reasons.17 
Such a divide, according to McDowell, loses sight of Kant’s insight regarding 
the rational bearing of the world on thought, brought about through the 
notion of the joint operation of understanding and sensibility.18 
In order to capture Kant’s insight which, according to McDowell, does not 
fall prey to the Given or to Rortian coherentism, it is important to examine 
the notion of an external rational constraint bearing on thought. The 
rational bearing of the world on thought is grounded in the notion of 
experience as involving concepts as well as intuitions. 19  The empirical 
intuitions are yielded by the receptivity of the mind to empirical particulars 
(1929, A20=B34). Concepts, on the other hand, are rules or standards (A106 
& A126) which direct the activity of the mind in knowing the empirical 
particulars. That concepts help in knowing the particulars is grounded in 
the supposition that they condition experience as well. Therefore, the 
conceptual activity of understanding presupposes the conceptual 
organization of the empirical particulars. In other words, we can know our 
experiences because we are affected by empirical particulars as already 
conceptually determined. We know in that our faculty of understanding is 
able to produce judgments (involving the categorical synthesis of the 
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representation of the particulars). These judgments become knowledge 
when they get experience right. Hence, McDowell’s point about Kant: There 
is an external and empirical rational constraint on thought.20 
In “Avoiding the Myth of the Given,” McDowell refines his account of the 
empirical rational constraint by rejecting the Mind and World theses that 
experience has propositional content and that empirical content includes 
everything the subject can know non-inferentially (2009d, 258-59). In the 
revised position, McDowell distinguishes between intuitional experiential 
content and the discursive content of assertions and judgments. Discursive 
content is articulated (and propositional), and intuitional content is not 
(2009d, 262). Nevertheless, McDowell alleges that both are conceptual (262); 
so he preserves Sellars’s later distinction between sensory content and 
propositional content. From the publication of Science and Metaphysics 
onward, Sellars draws on Kant and interprets sensory content as a noun 
phrase, rather than construing it as a sentence as he did previously.21 On the 
revised view, the extra-judgmental rational constraint on perceptual 
judgments is the conceptual this-such nexus. The sensory this-such provides 
this external rational constraint on perceptual judgments, since it is made up 
of conceptualizations that are non-propositional and external to the 
discursive activity of judging. Perceptual judgments are true (i.e., they are 
non-inferential grounds of empirical knowledge), if they accord with the 
relevant aspects of the this-such nexus. The use of “noun phrase” above does 
not mean “we are ready in advance with words for every aspect of the 
content of our experience, nor that we could equip ourselves with words for 
every aspect of the content of our experience” (McDowell, 2007, 348). Rather, 
the terminology suggests that “no aspect is unnameable” (348). Being 
initiated into a language equips us with the conceptual capacities that 
enable us have a conceptual experience, aspects of which we can articulate. 
To put it more precisely, in experience, the unity of our conceptual 
capacities is drawn into operation. This allows for an overall access to the 
world, an access the aspects of which can become more precise and better 
articulated through further discursive training and comprehension of the 
unity’s fine-grained conceptual structure.22 
18                       Sophia Perennis, spring and summer 2020, Serial Number 37 
 
7. McDowell’s reading of Kant allows him to see Wittgenstein (pace Rorty) as 
a Kantian in three respects: 1) in his rejection of the Given, 2) in his 
insistence upon the rational bearing of the world on thought and judgment, 
and 3) in his rejection of any coherentist account of knowledge (which seeks 
– through a misguided attempt to evade an appeal to the Given – to eliminate 
the rational bearing of the world on the knowing subject). In regard to the 
rejection of the Given, McDowell sets forth Wittgenstein’s Private Language 
Argument which “applies the general rejection of the Given” (1994, 18) to 
the notion of private ostensive definitions. In Mind and World, McDowell 
argues that private ostensive definitions are abstractions based on a Given 
presence. 
[A]ny concept that was constituted by a justificatory relation to 
a bare presence would have to be a private concept. Making the 
abstraction that would be necessary to form such a concept 
would be giving oneself a private ostensive definition. In effect 
the idea that concepts can be formed by abstraction from the 
Given just is the idea of private ostensive definition (20). 
As apparent from McDowell’s comment, private ostensive definitions 
involve, in effect, the formation of universals or concepts from particular 
objects which are given to a subject as bare presences (“as what sensations 
and so forth are,” [20]). In other words, the subject manufactures a private 
ostensive definition by associating the sign ‘S’ with a sensation. The question 
is whether this definition is legitimate, and the answer is a resounding No. 
The reason is simple: the private ostensive definition does not provide a rule 
for the use of the sign. In other words, further applications of the sign ‘S’ are 
neither sanctioned nor forbidden by the private ostensive definition. Once 
the naming is performed, the next move is left entirely open. In Philosophical 
Investigations, Wittgenstein has this problem in mind when he remarks that 
“naming is not by itself a move in the language-game – any more than 
putting a piece on the board is a move in chess” (1953, §49). Putting a piece 
on the chessboard is not a legitimate move in chess, since it does not 
constrain the further use of that piece. In the same way, naming by itself is 
not a move in the language game, because it leaves the future use of the sign 
undetermined. 
It should be emphasized, in advance, that McDowell’s reading of 
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Wittgenstein’s treatment of private ostensive definitions does not reflect 
the commonplace approach to this aspect of Wittgenstein’s thinking. 
Therefore, the exposition of McDowell’s account of the Private Language 
Argument would gain in lucidity when contrasted with Saul Kripke’s 
influential take on Wittgenstein’s overcoming the problem of private 
ostension. In addition, Kripke’s approach will be seen to provide the details 
of what amounts to a coherentist reading of Wittgenstein’s Private Language 
Argument (a reading which can be endorsed by Rorty among others).  
Kripke, in Wittgenstein On Rules and Private Language, maintains that a central 
concern in the Philosophical Investigations is the articulation and the 
overcoming of the skeptical paradox. Wittgenstein articulates the skeptical 
paradox in the statement that “no course of action could be determined by 
a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with the 
rule” (1958, §201). Kripke reformulates the paradox in the claim that “there 
can be no fact as to what I mean by ... any ... word at any time” (1982, 21). 
The skeptical paradox has, as its corollary, 23  the problem of private 
ostension because once the private justificatory relation to a bare presence 
(as set forth in private ostensive definitions) is established, the next use of 
the sign is neither sanctioned nor forbidden. Kripke, to his credit, recognizes 
the force of the Wittgensteinian rejection of private ostensive definitions, as 
well as the paradox that emerges when one, in response to the rejection of 
the private ostensive definitions, tries to identify her sensations by criteria. 
The identification of sensations by criteria is paradoxical because it is 
reducible to the following absurdity: “if everything can be made out to 
accord with the rule, then it can also be made out to conflict with it” (1958, 
§201). In other words, the use of signs for Given particulars can be explained 
by some criteria, but the application of these criteria is not guaranteed, since 
the particulars, given independently of the criteria, can also be made to 
accord with some other set of criteria which conflict with the first ones.24 
This is a sort of skepticism since it casts doubt on one’s ability to understand 
the meaning of the signs.  
Kripke’s Wittgenstein, to McDowell’s disappointment, accepts the skeptical 
assumption (that meaning is determined by criteria for the use of signs) and 
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supplies a skeptical solution, arguing that communal agreement on 
meanings can make the semantic skepticism introduced by Wittgenstein 
benign (1982, 79). Kripke’s skeptical solution, in effect, implies a form of 
coherentism, akin to Rorty’s, which rejects the bearing of objects on our 
thoughts about them. In Kripke’s account, meanings are confined to the 
intersubjective and normative space of reasons, and the domain of 
interaction between the subject and the object (as a bare presence) is 
innocuously independent of that space. Wittgenstein may be seen endorsing 
this interpretation: “[I]f we construe the grammar of the expression of 
sensation on the model of ‘object and designation’ the object drops out of 
consideration as irrelevant” (1953, §293). But this is not an endorsement; it 
is rather a reason for giving up the model that constrains us to consider the 
object as irrelevant. We only need to read to §304 where Wittgenstein has 
the following exchange with his interlocutor: 
“And yet you again and again reach the conclusion that the 
sensation itself is a nothing.” – not at all. It is not a something, 
but not a nothing either!  The conclusion was only that a 
nothing would serve just as well as a something about which 
nothing could be said. We have only rejected the grammar 
which tries to force itself on us here. 
As apparent here, Wittgenstein does not endorse the ‘object and designation’ 
model of the way we express our sensations, because the ineffable object 
fails to make any contribution to our discourse about sensations. But instead 
of looking for meaning in the normative coherence of our designations, 
Wittgenstein rejects the grammar of ‘object and designation’ as structuring 
our talk about sensations. In other words, Wittgenstein is rejecting the 
grammar that expresses our sensation as a Given “preconceptual this [bare 
presence] which is supposed to ground our conceptualizations (the items 
that we want to gesture at, when it is pointed out that ‘pain’ and ‘sensation’ 
are words of our common language, with an inarticulate noise: §261)” 
(McDowell 1989, 290).  
In “Wittgenstein On Following a Rule,” McDowell supports the thesis that 
Wittgenstein rejects the grammar of ‘object and designation’ and the 
associated coherentist/skeptical solution to the paradox by pointing out 
that Wittgenstein dismisses the assumption that meaning is an 
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interpretation thrown over a bare presence – as involving a 
“misunderstanding” (Wittgenstein, 1958, §201). The nature of the 
misunderstanding is brought to light when Wittgenstein (in the same 
fragment) maintains that “there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an 
interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call ‘obeying a rule’ and 
‘going against it’ in actual cases” (§201). McDowell uses these passages to 
undermine Kripke’s account of Wittgenstein’s theory of meaning and offers 
a version of the straight solution to the skeptical paradox. McDowell’s 
straight solution rejects private ostensive definitions, the paradoxical 
version of the criterial account of meaning, as well as Kripke’s skeptical 
solution on the ground that they are in one way or another committed to 
the Myth (or, to use Wittgenstein’s word, the grammar) of the Given (1984, 
331). For McDowell’s Wittgenstein, our language does not require super-
rigid criteria for its use since our linguistic experiences take place in the 
context of customs and practices, and that experience is an adequate 
constraint on our judgments as to how a sign should be applied.25 
For McDowell, Wittgenstein’s notion of a custom or a practice is related to 
Kant’s notion of experience in that they both account for the meaningful use 
of language through the rational bearing of things on thought. This can be 
elucidated further by showing that Wittgenstein’s notion of practice also 
involves something like the Kantian insistence that experience is the result 
of the joint operation of sensibility and understanding. In Wittgensteinian 
vocabulary, sensibility amounts to receptivity to an item in a practice and 
must involve, as with Kant, more than sensitivity to a brute presence (as in 
the private linguist’s sensation); the things with which we have our practical 
commerce are already signified by the norms and proprieties of the relevant 
practices. Linguistic norms or rules, as we will see in §9, are pragmatic 
versions of Kant’s concepts. They are similar in that they condition our 
language-involving thoughts about objects. For Wittgenstein, to think of an 
object, the subject responds to the object according to the rules and 
standards making up the normative pattern of the practice. It is the 
pragmatic peculiarity of Wittgenstein’s view, one that is not present in Kant, 
that such a response is brought about by adequate training in that practice. 
Hence, Wittgenstein is not paradoxical (despite his own confession) when 
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he claims that “when we say, and mean, that such-and-such is the case, we 
– and our meaning – do not stop anywhere short of the fact; but we mean: 
this-is-so” (1953, §95). It is McDowell’s contention, in interpreting this 
passage and others of this sort, that there is no gulf between meanings 
(space of reasons) and the real world, as suggested by Rorty’s and Kripke’s 
Wittgenstein. For McDowell’s Wittgenstein, becoming a participant in a 
language game (resulting in the capacity to make claims that such-and-such 
is the case) gets to the things themselves (that this is so). This is because the 
concepts determining thoughts about objects in the world answer to the 
conceptualized practical context in which objects show themselves. 
Therefore, it seems that (McDowell’s) Wittgenstein and Kant are in 
considerable agreement when they reject the Given in favor of an external 
rational constraint.26 
Despite the affinity between Kant and Wittgenstein concerning the external 
rational constraints on thoughts, an important aspect of McDowell’s 
approach to Wittgenstein is a developmental view of the subject which, 
according to McDowell, goes missing in Kant’s account (1994, 111). For 
Wittgenstein, the subject begins as an apprentice to a practice, requiring 
instruction and supervision in order to act properly. The subject then 
proceeds to become competent, that is, she develops appropriate conceptual 
abilities and acquires independence in making the proper moves. This 
process of understanding culminates in the mastery of the practice allowing 
the subject not only the freedom to act in a certain manner but also the 
entitlement to approach the practice critically and creatively by holding the 
actual moves in the practice accountable to the salient normative 
constraints and revising where appropriate. However, McDowell argues that 
this aspect of the pragmatic approach to the subject is not available in Kant’s 
account (111). The culprit is Kant’s reliance on the supersensible. 
8. The above criticism of Kant is expressed in a suggestive manner and 
requires a broader analysis of the Kantian texts to display its full force. This 
section attempts to expand McDowell’s claim that “Kant cannot succeed in 
his admirable aim, to supersede traditional philosophy” (111), which I will 
assume to entail a commitment to the supersensible. The most conspicuous 
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protrusion of the reliance on traditional philosophy occurs in Kant’s account 
of the unity of the categories. The categorial unity, by itself, is not 
problematic. McDowell himself uses Kantian terminology to characterize 
the conceptuality of intuitional content as involving a “categorial unity” 
(2009d, 265)27 – the same unity involved in judgments – with the exception 
that intuitional (i.e., sensory) content is not propositional, as is the case in 
judgments (258 & 262-63). For Kant, categorial unity is the unity of the 
apperceptive I, that is, the unity of the “I think” that accompanies all my 
representations. Kant writes, “[t]he transcendental unity of apperception is 
that unity through which all the manifold given in an intuition is united in 
a concept of the object. It is therefore entitled objective” (1929, B139). 
McDowell interprets thus: “That intuitions are of objects … is to be 
understood in terms of their possessing the kind of unity that results when, 
in judging, one brings cognitions to the unity of apperception” (2009b, 148). 
To put it more precisely, the thing that is red, the this-red, as perceived 
through the senses, is of an object, that is, it has intentionality, because it 
involves the unarticulated unity of categories in the “I think”. In the Critique 
of Pure Reason, Kant takes pride that his metaphysics resolves the ancient 
problem of the unity of categories, which is required for a scientific 
approach to the study of being (1929, B110-11). He then faults Aristotle for 
articulating this unity rhapsodically28 by overlooking the importance of the 
faculty of judgment (i.e., the faculty of thought [A81-B106-07]) and the 
central role of the “I think” in affecting that unity (A106-10=B131-36). As 
McDowell puts it: “glimpses of objective reality … [are] interdependent with 
the subject’s being able to ascribe experiences to herself; hence, with the 
subject’s being self-conscious” (1994, 99).  
On McDowell’s view, however, Kant’s transformation of the Aristotelian 
account of the unity of conceptual space has at least two problematic 
features. First, Kant dissociates the “I think” from the empirical, substantial 
self. The apperceptive “I think” is the self that persists through time and 
“has nothing to do with the substantial identity of a subject who persists as 
a real presence in the world she perceives” (99). As a result, self-awareness 
is made into a formal, philosophical device and is deprived of its 
phenomenological qualities, which are relegated dismissively to the 
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empirical ego. Second, Kant denies that our “knowledge” gets the real world 
right, and limits it to the apparent world (1929, Bxxiii-xxiv). In Mind and 
World, for example, McDowell argues that Kant spoils his meritorious 
account of experience by framing it in terms of mind’s receptivity to the 
radically mind-independent supersensible. McDowell writes: “if we take 
Kant’s conception of experience out of the frame he puts it in, a story about 
a transcendental affection of receptivity by a supersensible reality, it 
becomes just what we need... But the frame spoils the insight” (1994, 95-6). 
McDowell finds this frame problematic because “the radical mind-
independence of the supersensible comes to seem exemplary of what any 
genuine mind-independence would be” (96). This exemplariness obscures 
mind’s relation to the world in Kant’s account of experience. In his more 
recent writings, McDowell has regretted saddling Kant with the 
transcendental framework discussed in Mind and World (2007, 77-8). 
McDowell, however, does insist that Kant’s account of space and time, as 
“human” forms of sensibility, limits the scope of conceptualization and 
excludes a robust objectivity (82ff). Therefore, Kant, who had a glimpse into 
the interdependence of self-consciousness and the consciousness of 
objective reality, fails to sustain the glimpse and lapses into a subjective 
idealism. What McDowell calls a failure inspires Sellars to endorse a form of 
scientism by modifying the problematic Kantianism. 
Sellars is disappointed when Kant does not posit sense impressions resulting 
from sheer receptivity as elements in a more full-blooded explanation of 
non-inferential claims in the space of reasons (1968, 9). He complains that 
Kant did not distinguish clearly between ‘forms’ of non-conceptual sense 
impressions and those of conceptual representations since “forms of 
sensibility proper become, as the argument of the Critique proceeds, forms 
of conceptual representations” (30). Therefore, despite his admirable 
rejection of the empiricist Given and his moves to explain minimal 
conceptual representation, Sellars’s Kant does not go far enough and 
reduces “the concepts of receptivity and sensibility to empty abstractions” 
(30). According to Sellars, we must await the end of scientific inquiry for our 
cognitive states to be in proper causal relation to the world. 29  In 
“Representation, Social Practise and Truth,” Rorty defines scientism as “the 
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assumption that every time science lurches forward philosophy must 
redescribe the face of the whole universe. Scienticists think that every 
discovery of micro-structure casts doubt on the ‘reality’ of the manifest 
macro-structure and the intervening middle structures” (1991c, p 160). 
Meanwhile, all we have are inadequate conceptual schemes that fail to 
picture reality adequately. McDowell, in tandem with Rorty, rejects this 
problematic scheme-content dualism, and he enlists Wittgenstein in this.  
9. Wittgenstein, true to the “spirit” of Kant’s philosophy, continues the 
critical enterprise by adjusting a major problem in the Kantian “letter” 
which concerns Kant’s appeal to a supersensible reality. In §217 of the 
Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein’s interlocutor asks a potentially 
Kantian question: “How am I able to obey a rule?” Wittgenstein offers two 
interpretations of this question, “If this is not a question about causes, then 
it is about the justification for my following the rule in the way I do” (1958, 
§217). The interlocutor’s question is a Kantian question only according to 
the interpretation in the consequent of Wittgenstein’s conditional. Kant’s 
appeal to the supersensible is meant to subvert the justification from 
experience. Wittgenstein’s response to the Kantian aspect of the 
interlocutor’s question is “if I have exhausted the justifications, I have 
reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: ‘This is 
simply what I do’” (§217). Wittgenstein can be interpreted as suggesting that 
the appeal to the noumenal realm as the sub-bedrock assurance in regard to 
whether I get the world right is redundant.  
For Kant, the need for the appeal to the supersensible reality arose from his 
anxiety concerning understanding. Having inherited the tradition’s 
irreverence for experience, Kant worried about empirical judgments 
licensed by the actualization of mere empirical concepts in experience. 
Therefore, he sought more assurances and claimed to have found them in 
the deep recesses of the subject.  
Wittgenstein, however, wants to dispel the Kantian worries. For 
Wittgenstein, the rational bearing of objects on thought is sufficient for 
one’s understanding of experience. In response to the Kantian anxiety about 
the authority of the empirical representations, Wittgenstein would say 
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briefly, “this is simply what I do” (§217). Having been trained in the salient 
practices or institutions supplies the adequate independent rational 
justification.30 In other words, justifications are available in the practices, 
not external to them.  
One could, however, ask for a causal account of how one obeys a rule and 
engages in a practice. Wittgenstein, anticipating this worry, responds: “I 
have been trained to react to this sign (the expression of a rule) in a 
particular way, and now I do so react to it” (§198). In other words, to the 
question concerning the causes of obeying a rule, Wittgenstein offers the 
story about apprenticeship and learning the techniques of a practice. Hence, 
Wittgenstein embraces a developmental view of the subject of experience 
not present in Kant. According to this view, the subject is always already in 
a community of practices. 31  As the subject develops, she begins to 
understand the language of her community. “To understand a language 
means to be a master of a technique” (§199), and to master a technique is to 
achieve higher levels of competence in a practice – to have acquired the 
proprieties of a practice in such a way that one performs the practice 
spontaneously as if it were second nature. One who thus understands a 
language is capable of employing it in such a way that her descriptions, for 
instance, are accurate; they depict the way things show themselves by 
drawing on one’s conceptual abilities. “[I]f a person has not yet got the 
concepts, I shall teach him to use the words by means of examples and by 
practice. –And when I do this I do not communicate less to him than I know 
myself” (§208). For Wittgenstein, one’s mastery of a technique seems to 
license her to teach that technique, but teaching does not necessarily 
involve direct communication of the techniques. The master practitioner 
can teach by examples, performances, and active supervision (this list is by 
no means exhaustive). The aim is to enable the initiate to carve out the 
concepts as they are actualized in her experience. Wittgenstein’s view of 
understanding as mastery of techniques involves a major departure from 
Kant’s views on “understanding” and “reason,” which involve trafficking 
with the supersensible. Wittgensteinian “understanding” is only limited by 
the training in the practices and institutions amidst which the subject finds 
herself.  
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10. This essay has sought to show that the Kantian critical enterprise is not 
a victim (pace Rorty) but a hero of the battle against the Given. Once this 
status of critical philosophy is brought to light, a deep and powerful 
relationship between Kant and the later Wittgenstein is unraveled. This 
essay has developed this relationship through McDowell’s reading of the 
bond between Kant’s concept of experience and Wittgenstein’s notion of 
practice. Kantian “experience” and Wittgenstein’s “practice” have been 
shown to abrogate the empiricist Given by invoking an external rational 
bearing on thoughts. 
It has also been shown that, despite his valuable concept of experience, 
Kant’s appeals to the noumenal realm unnecessarily shrink the scope of the 
space of reasons. Wittgenstein, according to the final argument of this essay, 
exorcises the appeal to the Kantian noumena through his modification of 
Kant’s notion of understanding. Wittgenstein defined understanding as the 
mastery of the techniques or the practices that make up the cultural-
linguistic tradition in which the subject finds herself. With this move, 
Wittgenstein showed that the understanding’s grasp of experience is not 
achieved through Kant’s noumenal, sub-bedrock assurances; we get things 




















1. Hilary Putnam and Stanley Cavell are examples of philosophers who claim that 
Wittgenstein’s thought is best understood when viewed against the background of 
Kant. In “Was Wittgenstein a Pragmatist?”, Putnam offers an extended discussion 
of the relation between Wittgenstein’s philosophy and that of Kant. He concludes: 
There were some genuine insights in Kant, insights which were hard 
won, and by which Wittgenstein was educated. Wittgenstein could 
not have seen so far if he had not stood on the shoulders of that giant 
(1994a, 41). 
See also Putnam’s claim, in “Rethinking Mathematical Necessity,” that Wittgenstein 
belongs to a Kantian tradition of thought about logical necessity (1994b, 246-8).  
A continuing interest in the relation between Kant and Wittgenstein can also be 
traced in Cavell’s writings. In “The Availability of Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy,” 
Cavell writes: 
The problems of philosophy are not solved by “hunting out new 
facts;”... What do such answers look like?  ... [W]e could say that what 
such answers are meant to provide us with is not more knowledge of 
matters of fact, but the knowledge of what would count as various 
“matters of fact.” ... It is a knowledge of what Wittgenstein means by 
grammar – the knowledge Kant calls “transcendental.” ... And where 
Kant speaks of “transcendental illusion” – the illusion that we know 
what transcends the conditions of possible knowledge – Wittgenstein 
speaks of the illusions produced by our employing words in the 
absence of the (any) language game which provides their 
comprehensible employment. ... If his similarity to Kant is seen, the 
differences [between Kant and Wittgenstein] light up the nature of 
the problems Wittgenstein sets himself. For Wittgenstein it would be 
an illusion not only that we do know things-in-themselves but equally 
an illusion that we do not (1962, 85-86). 
2. J. Alberto Coffa, in The Semantic Tradition From Kant to Carnap, argues that Kant is 
the father of the semantic tradition [the tradition of seeking “a conception of the a 
priori in which pure intuition played no role” (1991, 22)] in philosophy (7), and that 
Wittgenstein’s purposes were fundamentally opposed to that tradition: “their 
philosophical hopes seemed to be Wittgenstein’s fears; their projects, 
Wittgenstein’s targets; their enemies, Wittgenstein’s friends” (141). Coffa further 
argues that “even Kant was too much of a rationalist for Wittgenstein’s taste, since 
... Kant remained enthusiastic about science and rationality in general” and that “if 
Wittgenstein was a fifth column among semanticists, it is because from the very 
beginning his heart was with one of the most romantic, unrational versions of 
idealism. If it ever looked otherwise, it is in part because he joined the enemy camp 
in order to display its failure from within” (141-2). Rudolf Haller, in Questions on 
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Wittgenstein, in a similar vein, explicitly takes issue with Cavell’s alignment of Kant 
and Wittgenstein. He goes on to deny the parallel between Kant and Wittgenstein 
even more vehemently than Coffa, stating that “Wittgenstein seemed to follow 
Mauthner, who replied to the neo-Kantian motto ‘back to Kant’ with his own: ‘back 
to Hume’ “ (1988, 53); Haller concludes: “the critique of language is not the critique 
of reason” (1988, 52-3). 
3. The problematic character of this presumption can be illustrated by comparing 
Eric Stenius’s claim that “Wittgenstein was in essential respects a Kantian 
philosopher” (1960, 214), and James Conant’s apparently parallel claim that certain 
basic ideas of Wittgenstein have their source in Kant (1991, 115). The “presumption” 
would lead one to suppose that Stenius and Conant are allies when, in fact, the 
philosophical positions which Conant attributes to Kant and Wittgenstein are in 
clear opposition to the ones which Stenius attributes to them. Stenius insists that 
“what Kant’s transcendental deductions are intended to perform ... is performed by  
(Wittgenstein’s) logical analysis of language” (1960, 218). Thus, Stenius concludes: 
Wittgenstein moves the limits of theoretical reason to the limits of 
language. Whereas Kant thought “possible to theoretical reason” to 
be a more narrow concept than “logically possible,” these two 
concepts are identical according to Wittgenstein (219). 
Conant, however, distinguishes two notions of limit: 1) limit as imposed by the laws 
of logic and 2) limit as the boundary of theoretical discourse. Conant does not see 
the Tractatus (as Stenius does) as identifying these two notions of a limit, but rather 
as seeking to follow Kant in arguing that the former notion of a limit rests upon a 
confused conception of logical necessity. Conant reads the transcendental 
deduction as supplying the limiting concepts for significant thought in theoretical 
discourse – as marking the limit not of thought per se, but of thought about objects. 
This limit, according to Conant, is transgressed “in philosophical speculation” (1991, 
171), while the laws of logic cannot be transgressed and “should not be represented 
as imposing a limit on thought” (171). Conant finds Wittgenstein to be a Kantian 
insofar as he is sensitive to the two notions of limit and has corresponding notions 
in his own philosophy. Stenius, from the standpoint of Conant’s reading, 
misunderstands Kant and therefore Wittgenstein’s Kantianism. 
4. I develop the Sellarsian attack on the Myth of the Given in Chapter 1 of my Analytic 
Philosophy and Avicenna: Knowing the Unknown (2020, 9-22). 
5. In Analytic Philosophy and Avicenna (2020, 16-19), I make the case for this reading, 
drawing on A78=B103 among other passages in the Critique of Pure Reason. 
6. Refer to Chapter 3 of my Analytic Philosophy and Avicenna for a more detailed 
treatment of McDowell’s criticisms of Rorty (2020, 36-51). 
7. Sellars, in Empiricism and Philosophy of Mind, maintains that “many things have 
been said to be ‘given’: sense contents, material objects, universals, propositions, 
real connections, first principles, even givenness itself” (1956, 253). Sellars, in his 
article, subsequently narrows his concern to the role played by the Given in sense-
datum theories. This is precisely the version of the Given to which Rorty pays the 
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most attention. Nevertheless, there is ample reason to think that Rorty (like Sellars) 
means to be opposing any form of appeal to the Given. 
8 . Rorty summarizes the dilemma as follows: “insofar as a Kantian intuition is 
effable, it is just a perceptual judgment, and thus not merely ‘intuitive.’ Insofar as it 
is ineffable, it is incapable of having an explanatory function” (1982a, 4). 
9. McDowell’s criticism of Rorty’s reading of Kant implies a rejection of the second 
premise. McDowell reads Kant as arguing that experience results from the 
cooperation of concepts and intuitions. Intuitions, as such, are the products of the 
Kantian analysis of experience and concern the reference to particulars in 
judgments of experience. This view undermines Rorty’s interpretation which relies 
on an account of intuitions as pre-conceptual Givens. See §6 for a more detailed 
treatment of the contrast between Rorty’s reading of Kant and that McDowell. 
10. Rorty writes: “what Kant had called ‘the constitution of the empirical world by 
synthesis of intuitions under concepts,’ Dewey wanted to call ‘interactions in which 
both extra-organic things partake.’ ... [T]he level of generality to which Dewey 
ascends is the same level at which Kant worked, and the model of knowledge is the 
same – the constitution of the knowable by the cooperation of two unknowables. 
Sounding like Kant is a fate that will overtake any systematic account of human 
knowledge which purports to supplant both physiological Lockean accounts and 
sociological Hegelian accounts by something still more generic. The ‘ontology of the 
sensible manifold’ is the common destiny of all philosophers who try for an account 
of subject-and-object, mind-and-body, which has this generic quality” (1982b, 84-5). 
11. The proponents of Erkenntnistheorie declared their task to be, as Rorty puts it, 
“the patient labor of sorting out the ‘given’ from the ‘subjective additions’ made by 
the mind” (1979, 133-34). 
12. It may be objected that this reading of Sellars conflates internalist 
foundationalism (the proper target of Sellars’s attack) and some version of 
externalism. The proper target of Sellars’s attack is the Myth of the Given as found 
in some forms of empiricism, and the Given does not simply imply an assumed 
foundation for justification. It also entails that such a foundation be “knowledge of 
matter of fact,” that is, it should depict how things really are. This latter implication 
is brought out by the causal account of the impact real things on sensibility. 
13 . In “Why Is Sellars’s Essay Called ‘Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind’?” 
(2009c), John McDowell reads Sellars in this way. I also support this reading in my 
Analytic Philosophy and Avicenna (2020, 14-16). 
14. In his work, Robert Brandom accounts for the representational dimension of 
observation reports through the interplay between the reporter and an 
interlocutor. Brandom explains getting things right in our non-inferential 
perceptual judgments by invoking the endorsement of the 
interlocutor/scorekeeper and her undertaking of the commitment ascribed to the 
reporter. See, for example, his discussion in “Knowledge and the Social Articulation 
of the Space of Reasons,” (1995, 903). Brandom’s social practice view, however, 
overlooks a sensible way of explicating non-inferential perceptual judgments as 
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justified by the experience of the world. I develop my criticism of Brandom’s reading 
of Sellars in my Analytic Philosophy and Avicenna (2020, 14-16). 
15. In “Representation, Social Practice and Truth,” Rorty argues that Davidson’s 
work on the role of the disquotational theory of truth in a viable theory of meaning 
eliminated the last trace of representationalism by showing that the proper context 
for a theory of truth is semantics, not epistemology. “So the thing to do is to marry 
truth and meaning, and conversely. But that theory will be of no use to a 
representationalist epistemology, nor to any other sort of epistemology. It will be 
an explanation of what people do, rather than of a non-causal, representing relation 
in which they stand to non-human entities” (1991c, 154). I critique Rorty’s dualism 
in Chapter 3 of my Analytic Philosophy and Avicenna (2020, 36-51). 
16. Rorty (1991a, 3) supports his reading of Wittgenstein as an anti-
representationalist by invoking Michael Dummett’s essay, “Can Analytic Philosophy 
Be Systematic, and Ought it to Be” where Dummett claims to set forth a central idea 
of Wittgenstein “about which it would be universally agreed that any attempt to 
construct a theory of meaning must come to terms with [it]” (1978, 452). This idea 
involves “the rejection of the conception, advanced by Frege and by Wittgenstein 
himself in the Tractatus, that the meanings of our sentences are given by conditions 
that render them determinately true or false, in favor of one according to which 
meaning is to be explained in terms of what is taken as justifying an utterance” 
(452). Rorty fastens unto the idea presented here and claims that Wittgenstein 
rejects representationalism. I will offer my critique of this reading of Wittgenstein 
in §7. 
17. Although McDowell’s primary target, in his critique of coherentism, is Donald 
Davidson, he finds Rorty applauding and exaggerating “the aspects of Davidson’s 
thinking” that he has “objected to” (1994, 146). 
18. I develop this reading of Kant in Analytic Philosophy and Avicenna (2020, 16-19). 
19. Kant expresses his view of experience, in a historical manner, as involving a 
course in between Leibniz and Locke. “Leibniz intellectualized appearances, just as 
Locke ... sensualized all concepts of the understanding, i.e., interpreted them as 
nothing more than empirical or abstracted concepts of reflection. Instead of seeking 
in understanding and sensibility two sources of representations which ... can supply 
objectively valid judgments of things only in conjunction with each other, each of 
these great men holds to one only of the two, viewing it as an immediate relation to 
things in themselves. The other faculty is then regarded as serving only to confuse 
or to order the representations which this selected faculty yields” (1929, 
A271=B327).  
20. Although McDowell argues that Kant and Wittgenstein share the thesis that 
there is an external rational constraint on thought, he (McDowell) is careful to note 
that their accounts of how it is that there is such an external rational constraint 
differ. I will develop this difference in §§8-9. 
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21. McDowell acknowledges this in “A Sellarsian Blind Spot,” (2016, 101). Along with 
Science and Metaphysics, see also Sellars's “Some Remarks on Perceptual 
Consciousness.”  
22. For a more detailed discussion of McDowell’s later view, see my Analytic 
Philosophy and Avicenna (2020, 31-32, 68, 86). 
23. Kripke states that “the impossibility of private language emerges as a corollary 
of his [Wittgenstein’s] skeptical solution of his own paradox” (1982, 68). 
24 . Kripke illustrates the skeptical paradox thus: “Now suppose I encounter a 
bizarre sceptic ... he suggests, as I used the term ‘plus’ in the past, the answer I 
intended for ‘68 + 57’ should have been ‘5’!  Of course the sceptic’s suggestion is 
obviously insane ... After all, he says, if I am now so confident that, as I used the 
symbol ‘+’, my intention was that ‘68 + 57’ should turn out to denote 125, this cannot 
be because I explicitly gave myself instructions that 125 is the result performing the 
addition in this particular instance. By hypothesis, I did no such thing. But of course 
the idea is that, in this new instance, I should apply the very same function or rule 
that I applied so many times in the past. But who is to say what function this was? 
... So, perhaps in the past I used  
‘plus’ and ‘+’ to denote a function which I will call ‘quus’ and symbolize by ‘⊕’. It is 
defined by   
X⊕y = x +y, if x, y<57 
=5 otherwise 
who is to say that this is not the function I previously meant by ‘+’” (1982, 8-9)? 
25. McDowell writes: “The upshot is that if something enters into being a participant 
in the relevant customs, it enters equally into being capable of making any 
judgments at all. We have to give up that picture of genuine truth, in which the 
maker of a true judgment can shrink to a point of pure thought, abstracted from 
anything that might make him distinctively and recognizably one of us” (1984, 352). 
26. There is a temptation, if one is not sufficiently alive to the snares of idealism, to 
infer from the above account that the existence of all objects is dependent on 
human practices or experience. This conclusion and the thesis that supported it are 
then reduced to absurdity by pointing out that dinosaurs, for instance, went extinct 
well before the advent of any of the human practices and institutions; yet we seem 
to have a deluge of evidence that they existed. Such arguments can be refuted by 
rejecting their assumption that the existence of all objects is dependent on human 
practices. Although it is true that many types of objects, i.e., chess pieces, flags, 
money, etc., depend for their existence on human practices, there are a host of other 
objects whose existence lacks this sort of dependence. This does not imply a 
contradiction in McDowell’s account of Wittgenstein’s position but a peculiarity in 
some of our practices in which objects do not depend on the practices for their 
existence but are, nevertheless, understood according to the grammar supplied by 
those practices. This is not ad hoc; scientific activities, for instance, involve 
sophisticated practical constraints, but this does not mean that atoms or molecules 
came into being as soon as the appropriate disciplines were developed. Scientific 
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practices supply us with the concepts to think objects like atoms or dinosaurs (or to 
be able to discourse about them), but these concepts do not determine their objects 
in the same way as the rules of chess determine chess pieces. Hence, in some of our 
practices, including the scientific ones, the concepts underdetermine objects, and 
that should be enough to evade the idealist challenge.  
This point is put in an interesting manner by Elizabeth Anscombe. In “The Question 
of Linguistic Idealism,” she introduces Hume’s observation regarding the natural 
unintelligibility of promises and extends the notion to rules. To be “naturally 
unintelligible” is to not be an expression of “perception or experience” which she 
means in the sense of Humean sense impression. Naturally unintelligible things, 
according to Anscombe, “are understood by those of normal intelligence as they are 
trained in the [appropriate] practice” (1976, 121). In other words, naturally 
intelligible notions – such as the existence of dinosaurs, horses, giraffes, colors, and 
shape are not the products of human linguistic practices. But “if there is such a thing 
as idealism about rules and about the necessity of doing this if you are in conformity 
with this rule, then here Wittgenstein was a linguistic idealist. He insists that these 
are the creation of human linguistic practices” (122). 
27. See also “Conceptual Capacities in Perception,” (2009a, 127) and “Apperceptive 
I and the Empirical Self” (2009b, 148-49).  
28 . For an account of Aristotle’s so-called rhapsodic account of the unity of 
categories, see my Analytic Philosophy and Avicenna (2020, 88-90). 
29. Sellars’s scientism is characterized by slogans like “science is the measure of all 
things, of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not” (Sellars, 1997, 83). 
30. McDowell amplifies this Wittgensteinian response to Kant in this way: “Kant 
wants subjects of experience and intentional action to be already, just as such, in 
possession of objective reality. He wants exercises of conceptual powers to be 
intelligible only as undertaken by subjects who do not need philosophy to regain 
the world for them. But since he lacks a pregnant notion of second nature, and has 
no inclination to naturalize spontaneity within the realm of law, the best he can 
provide in the way of an experiencing and intending subject is the merely formal 
reference he allows to ‘I’, in the ‘I think’ that must be able to ‘accompany all my 
representations’” (1994, 111). 
31 . In The Bounds of Sense, F. Strawson, to whom McDowell expresses great 
indebtedness, affirms the viability of this approach to Kant and Wittgenstein thus: 
“We should remember that all [of] Kant’s treatment of objectivity is managed under 
a considerable limitation, almost, it might be said, a handicap. He nowhere depends 
upon, or even refers to, the factor on which Wittgenstein, for example, insists so 
strongly: the social character of our concepts, the links between thought and speech, 
speech and communication, communication and social communities ... [A]n other 
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